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## THE KANT CENTENNIAL AT CONCORD.

[The following verbatim report of the discussions at the Concord School of Philosophy on occasion of the Kant Centennial has been received from the secretary, Mr. Sanborn:]

## CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

SATURDAY, August 6, 1881.

The session opened at nine A. M. with a poem by Mrs. Julia Ward Howe, who explained that the poem was written many years ago (dated 1866), and that she now presented it "as a little offering to the Centennial of the great master."

## ON LEAVING FOR A TIME THE STUDY OF KANT.

Dull seems the day that brings no hour with thee,  
O Master! lapsed to eternity.  
I am as loath to leave thy guiding hand  
As babes to quit the mother's knee and stand.  
My memory shows the rude chaotic ways  
Wherein I walked ere thou re-form'dst my days.

Truth was the airy palace that I sought,  
Through many a wild adventure dreamed or wrought.  
Lo! at thy touch its crystal turrets rise,  
Set in the golden gloom of evening skies.  
Experience widening Wisdom's sacred scope,  
The fixed ideal, the everlasting hope.

[Dr. Kedney then read Professor Porter's paper on "The Relation of Kant's Philosophy to Ethics and Religion."]

## DISCUSSION.

*Mrs. Julia Ward Howe*—If any comment upon the essay is desired or permitted, and I might venture to suggest a criticism, it is an effort to make the theory carry too much theological baggage. It seems to me to put theology and philosophy too much together, as if the one was bound to do all the work of both. I do not think that they are. I suppose different people see very different things in their philosophy. But I see in Kant one good thing, that while he shows what is the domain of philosophy pure and simple, he does not at all go into the province of theology, which is a province by itself.

*Mr. Emery*—Do you mean, Mrs. Howe, that Kant considered his

"Critique of Pure Reason" as covering the whole domain of philosophy proper, or would you include his "Critique of the Practical Reason" in the statement that he did not intend to consider questions of theology?

*Mrs. Howe*—I confess I realize a little of what I quoted last night from a French author: that it requires too much effort to follow such a discourse to be able to do much in criticising it afterwards. I do not think that Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason" assumed to exhaust philosophy any more than any man can. I do not think he attempted to shut the door. We see that, because those who followed him and added so much have felt rather invited to do so than forbidden by his attitude.

*Dr. Jones*—There are people who seem to expect to find as a result of philosophic thought something consummated, round finished marbles or balls of conclusion, that we can fill our pockets of memory with, and carry with us as a result. The greatness of this thinker appears in the fact that he raised to view the never-ended problems of human life and human society; that his *thinking* is his philosophy; not his *RESULT* of thinking, but his thinking itself. His is the force that acts upon the thought of the world; that moves us again to think, and not to the vanity of seeking to clutch some result of thought, some last word, some completed philosophy that will supersede all philosophic thinking. He is the great philosopher who, by thinking most regally, moves the philosophic thought of the race, not unto consummations and conclusions. For these themes of philosophy, we must remember, are universal. Is man to exhaust the thought of the universe? He may find the key; he may find the process of thinking; but shall we have a system of thought in the world which shall consummate and end the philosophic thinking of mankind? No such thing has ever appeared, or shall appear. He is the greatest thinker who most impresses and moves to thought those who think. And, after all, philosophy, as a body and unity of philosophic thought, is not an abstraction. It is not an abstract unity; it is a concrete unity. It is comprehensive of all schools of thought in the history of philosophizing. And when we shall have received and comprehended these impulses of those various great thinkers, and shall have incorporated them into our processes, we shall have made our use of them. They will have contributed their light, their treasure, to the thought of the world in that form.

So I am occupied but very little with the question of the deficiencies, the limitations, the want of "*consummation*" in this thinker. What does he say that is true? That is my interest in the able paper that we have heard this morning. Neither Aristotle, nor Plato, nor Kant, nor Schel-

ling, nor Hegel is to be looked to as having spoken the last word, as having given us the consummation of philosophic thought. They are all too wise to think that, and we should accept their contributions without doing them that injustice.

*Mr. Alcott*—So far as I have been able to comprehend Kant's distinction between the Pure Reason and the Practical, I should say that in the first treatise he was endeavoring to explore the possibilities, the reach of the pure intellect, or the reason unilluminated by faith, or, by what he calls the "categorical imperative," the conscience. So I will take these two terms—reason and conscience—as expressing, in a generalized form, the two phases of Kant's thinking.

In the first treatise he does not seem to have taken into his thought what he called the Practical Reason in the other; he uses "reason" in two senses. But really does he not mean faith, or the necessary influence which the affections have upon reason, or which the moral sense or conscience within us has upon reason? He finds in this first treatise that the reason cannot solve moral questions, and, as our essayist has said, he becomes confused because he is seeking to find depths by the pure reason which of itself it cannot fathom. He finds he can come to no sure conclusions, and he ends in the unknowable, and must be classed as an agnostic with Spencer and Huxley and all that class. The Free Religionists largely, and even Unitarians to some extent, appear to have fallen into that error, and may quote Kant as authority.

Thus he settles nothing satisfactorily. He merely shows the infirmity of reason by itself. Then taking it up again in his Practical treatise, he speaks of the Categorical Imperative. "You ought," he says. "There is ought." There is something more in that ought than in pure reason. Pure reason is not sufficient. The conscience, the moral sentiment, ascends above it. All that we can do is to strive to find it, to find in the conscience the voice of God, the Holy Spirit descending and taking possession of the human soul, and thus empowering the reason to make new discoveries, extend its horizon wider and wider under the illumination, the inspiration of faith.

Now, putting those two facts together—conscience and reason—and trying to find a term which will express all that can be thus received or conceived, we say *revelation*. For, unless a revelation is made to the heart, the love in us, and also to the reason through the moral sentiment, revelation is incomplete; it is but a doctrine, a dogma.

So, treating Kant with all hospitality, I conceive of him as a Columbus exploring unknown regions. We might say to-day, after the essay we have heard, that here was a grand mind to whom we are all indebted;

and we shall no longer go into that realm where went the deists and that class of people, and tried to solve the riddle of the world through their senses. Kant lifted us from that, and showed us that there is something in our minds not derived from the senses, that the senses can only reflect what is in the mind. What a step that was! to take us out of our senses and show us that these can only reflect in images the ideas in the mind; which are innate, eternal; that we brought them with us here at birth as truth, justice, love, mercy, and beauty, being all revelations and intuitions. They are the counters by which we measure everything we know. Take any act. We have an idea of justice in our minds; no act comes up to it in our senses. We never see beauty itself with our eyes; we see it in our minds. Where did we get it, then? We never saw perfect holiness out there, save in one divine instance. The perfect holiness, then, is a revelation in one being in human form. And so the Church is planted on that faith alone.

Thus, I conceive Kant says nothing contrary to that. Kant is an explorer; he goes on to unfold relations, and tells us, with an absolute honesty of conviction, what he saw, and no more. When he saw anything, he has reported it to us; and when he put out his sounding-lines and brought up nothing, he said so. Is not that what he did, this Columbus? That is the man we are here celebrating in this chapel. And have not all the lecturers shown that he was a splendid genius? Though he does not speak in Biblical phrase or theological, but ethically; where our teaching has its root and grounds, we need ethics to interpret the revelation. We need life to inspire the reason, the heart, and make the will docile and obedient—our will, our reason, and our affections all precipitating themselves into a righteous and perfect deed.

*Mr. Cohn*—If I may venture to offer a criticism, I would say that not enough attention is generally paid to the titles of Kant's two greatest works. I come, after all, exactly to the same conclusion as Mr. Alcott. Kant wrote first the "Critique of Pure Reason," then the "Critique of Practical Reason." I want to call attention to that word "practical," the meaning of which includes action; in Greek, *πράττειν*, to do, to act, to make. It seems to me that the great philosophical discovery of Kant is this: As long as we remain in the domain of pure thinking, our mind criticising itself, we fatally come to utter scepticism. But we are in a world of action; we cannot withdraw ourselves from it. We *have* to act, and so truth is to be found not in the abstract simplicity of thinking, but in the concrete complexity of life, so that we must not go from philosophy to ethics, but from ethics to philosophy. That is why Kant comes to more definite conclusions in his "Critique of Practical Reason" than in the

“Critique of Pure Reason,” although the conclusions at which he arrives may be criticised. The whole is a question of method.

*Professor Harris*—I think we call Kant the Columbus, not because he was like the three wise men of Gotham who went to sea in a bowl, and lost his adventurous craft in the deep, but because he went through the voyage and discovered something. He did not drop his line in and catch nothing; he found *something*. It is possible he did not know what he found; did not know what to call it, and made a mistake as to its value and that the philosophers of later times know how to appreciate the results and the greatness of his discoveries better than he did. I would venture to say that, in order to appreciate the results of Kant and the results of the whole German school, we should remember the conclusions that we had given us in the essay of Professor Morris yesterday morning: that we are to interpret those results by aid of the Greek philosophy, and not by the German philosophy, German philosophy being not well able to state itself in terms of ontology.

I would like to repeat and emphasize Dr. Jones's statement that philosophy does not come to give a finality to things. Even if a philosopher has found an absolute system of philosophy, that is not the last word. That is the first word. When he has found a solution of things, he must now begin to apply it, for it is a solution which may be applied to explain the world, and nobody pretends that the world is finite. It is a perpetual evolution in fact; and if you explain all that there is to-day, you would have more to explain to-morrow, because it is an infinite revelation of the Infinite Being. And therefore the solution or result which may have explained to the Greek the world in which he lived, may not be an explanation to-day; because each philosophy has not only to explain the world, but it has to explain the world plus the explanations made by the previous philosophers, and the effect of those philosophies upon the world. The general tendency of our papers for the past three days has been in the direction of an attempt to explain the great influence of the Kantian philosophy upon the history of the world since his time.

Now philosophy, we must remember, seeks to find one principle with which to explain what is. If that one principle is not central, is not fundamental, of course its explanations will be imperfect. But in proportion as that principle is central, it will give us rational explanations and reduce the many to the one, and show that the many belong to a system, because the finding of the one in the many is reducing the many to a system—not as with a rope of sand, but reducing the many to an organic whole through the discovery of dependence and essential relation.

Philosophy is in possession of this one principle, and has not arrived at it in this generation, but arrived at it long ago. The whole Oriental world celebrates the fact that the universal is the nature of the divine, though it has failed, according to our standards, in explaining how the particular is to be reconciled to the universal. It seems to me they were unable to do that. It must be confessed, however, that the Greek philosophy succeeded where the Oriental failed, and that it has left in eternal forms that solution, the relation of the universal to the particular; it has shown how the universal is an activity (as was emphasized in Professor Morris's paper yesterday)—is an activity of some independent being. The universal is no abstract generality; it is a concrete process. All mind is concrete, individual, and appears in no other way. There is no general mind which is not at the same time individual. That has been said by Aristotle.

We have, too, the principle of participation, the *μέθεξις* of Plato. That is the greatest principle, because in it lies all freedom, all development of society in modern times—the development of free republics, the separation of the functions of government, so that from one despotic whole we have by and by a republic, with local self-government, and the functions of government divided among independent departments—the legislative, judiciary, and executive—each perfectly independent, but forming one organic whole. That is the *Συστοιχία*. Then we have the first and second entelechies, explaining how there can be a being which comes out of nature, and is first a natural being—which stands there as a product of nature—totally depraved you may say as an outcome of nature, because everything in nature is determined from outside. He is there as a first entelechy, and he must realize his ideal, and must become the second entelechy. Then he has realized the divine within himself, and attained real independence where before he had only potential independence as first entelechy. When he begins his being, potential independence is there. There is spontaneity. He may will anything; he may will a contradiction; he may put himself into the meshes of fate by sin, because the worst fate that comes to any one is the fate that comes of a misuse of his will, twining ropes around his neck and destroying himself; that is the worst fate which arises, that from the misuse of the human will—sin and immorality.

He is then to realize his ideal. That ideal will enable him to put his freedom into the form of consistency, and then he will grow into independence; not that independence which he uses to injure himself, to reduce himself to dependence, to fetter his soul, to "nail it to the body." Therefore we say that this first entelechy must realize in itself the divine

idea of the universe in order to become really free, or the second entelechy; that is, to make its freedom into actuality, to make its independence perfect. This is the view of the world that Aristotle gives us, the growth from the first entelechy to the second entelechy—to that *ἐνέργεια*—energy, which we have borrowed in our English as a word expressing so much.

This is ontology without any thought of the distinction of subjective and objective, but the subjective and the objective will loom up with the development of Christianity, which holds to the infinite importance of the human soul. Not to the soul as an abstraction; but the importance of each individual soul; for each has a destiny which he can solve only by his own activity. Nobody can endow him with a divine being or with holiness; he cannot be made good by external additions. He can only be developed through his own freedom. And with the idea of freedom comes out the great problem of philosophy in modern times. The old problem was the resolution of the universal and the particular; in modern times it is that of the mediation between the objective and the subjective. This problem looms up and develops into the scepticism of Hume. Then Kant comes and takes this inventory of the subjective. And the inventory of the subjective contributes what? It finds all those things that the Greek thought found to be the substantial principles; it finds that they are the frame of the mind itself. Kant found all that. He did not drop his line into the sea and bring up nothing; he brought up the same treasures that the Greeks found. And so we see how Kant came to the same results as Aristotle did. Aristotle's process was a logical one, taking up time and space in his physics, and then in his metaphysics taking up the various categories and leading them out to their ultimate premises. What is the ultimate presupposition of this world as a whole—man, nature—what is it? This presupposes something. It is not complete in itself. You see in this the great meaning implied in the Platonic idea—namely, that the realities of nature are not fully realities; they are only partial realities, because they only realize a part of their own definition. It is only man that has all the potentialities and becomes an entelechy. Other things only participate in their archetype; they have to go through a process of change in which they lose their individuality; but here is man who can complete himself in himself. His change and development can go on within himself. The wise man who has the experience of life in himself is more free, more intellectual, has more within himself, is more independent, and more of a revelation of the divine Being, than the child or the savage. They are potentially free; he is actually free. This, then, is the problem before Aristotle: man and nature. What is the ultimate

presupposition † He takes it up in common, natural objects, and then in man ; and he does it wonderfully, taking up the categories which the Greek language had worked out so remarkably. (A philologist of insight would know when he saw the Greek language, and the form of its sentences, that there was a nation designed under Providence to solve the theoretical problem of the world.) He carries these things back to the idea of a self-active being whose self-activity is pure intellect. Herbert Spencer has grown to the idea of an ultimate Force which is no particular force, although it makes all particular forces. It is an Energy acting in itself. Therefore its activity is self-determination. Mr. Spencer does not say that ; but it lies in the thought of persistent force, and there is no escape from it. That is Plato's Idea, and Aristotle's *Actus purus*. You can identify self-determination with intellect, because that which makes self-limitation objectifies itself, and both limits and annuls the limit ; but when it annuls limit, as you do when you remove that limit out of your mind, the limit is no hard limit ; but when you remove the object of your thought, you return to yourself. And the only possible being that can do that—the only realization of that process—is mind. Mind does that all the time. That which is able utterly to annul this limit, as well as to make it, transcends time and space. When you annul the thought of the things of sense, and form in the mind the thought of the genus or species, you transcend time and space utterly and totally. And the being that can do that has a subjectivity elevated above time and space, and, therefore, a personality that does not descend into change and decay.

Just think of natural science and what it has to do to elaborate this thought of Aristotle, and to see it throughout nature in every direction. Talk about philosophy being a finality ! Why, its work has only begun. I cannot help thinking of the fine image which Mrs. Howe's poem of this morning suggested. I was reminded also of that hymn of Coleridge before Mont Blanc, in the Valley of Chamouni, when he sees those majestic forms rising there in eternal light above the clouds, above change and decay. All around us below, as in Church's "Heart of the Andes," we see growth, multiplicity, and vegetation, and evidences of human life in the villages and cultivated fields ; and then we see the stream that produces this fertility of the valley. Whence does it come ? It springs from the glacier up there, where the conflict between the sun-God and the ice-God takes place. It is there that this principle of fertility and variety is produced.

So philosophy does not come as something that is abstract and has no relation to concrete life ; but it has come for the very purpose of explaining things as they are, and of directing them to their ideal forms. And

so we look up above the valley and see what sends down this multiplying, fructifying impulse, and we see Primal Philosophy and Theology—the sources of rational insight and directive power in human life. Those lines of Tennyson come into my mind where he speaks of the sunshine land :

“ And then I looked up toward a mountain tract  
That girt the region with high cliff and lawn ;  
I saw that every morning far withdrawn,  
Beyond the darkness and the cataract,  
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.”

But what shall we think of the technique of philosophy ? Why should philosophy have technique at all ? It has been objected to as being unnecessary and pedantic. The language which speaks of finite things and their relations speaks of fragments of the universe broken off and considered apart ; is that language adequate to define and describe the totality and its unchangeable conditions, its eternal verities ?

“ But on the limits far withdrawn  
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.”

Far above change and decay we see the great shining light that streams from those lofty heights of Being inviting us up, but which we cannot ascend in a capricious and arbitrary mood ; we can ascend only with those celestial virtues of faith, hope, and charity. And when we become inspired with those virtues we shall be ready to receive the language of philosophy and theology which states those things adequately, although it states them in a language unfamiliar with sense. Will not, in fact, the spiritual insight demand other and more adequate terms in which to describe the eternal verities than this style of gossip and prating of the vanities of the day ? The thoughts of fragmentary reality must be mended by synthesis in order to be adequate to the real of all reals. So must the expression be mended, and we must have a technique for philosophy.

The voice that cries up the slope its questions of destiny will not hear the reply in the language of village tattle. To such it will be as to those in *The Vision of Sin*,

“ To whom an answer pealed from that high land,  
But in a tongue they could not understand,  
Though on the glimmering limit far withdrawn,  
God made himself an awful rose of dawn.”

*Dr. Mears*—My interest in this Kant celebration is a practical one as a teacher, desiring that our teaching in philosophy should take a higher

platform than it has done. One difficulty about teaching Kant has been, not, as Mrs. Howe has intimated, that he had "too much theological baggage," but that he had too much infidel baggage. We could not get the people to study him, because they thought he was the father and source of all the so-called rationalism of Germany. Now I am indebted to President Porter for bringing out the fact that that sort of thing was there before Kant, but that Kant gave it its death-blow. Now if we can get men to take that view—and I do not know any man in the country that is better able to dispose and persuade our teachers to take hold of Kant—we have done the best thing we could in this Centennial celebration.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION.

Professor Bascom read a paper on "The Freedom of the Will, Empirically Considered," prefacing it with some criticisms of Kant, and also some remarks upon philosophical technique, in which he contended that terminology should be capable of translation into common language. If philosophy be ultimately a settling of the limits of authority of human knowledge, then it must take hold of human knowledge where it exists in the minds of the mass of men and explain it there, and apply all its limitations and principles there and not elsewhere.

#### DISCUSSION.

Immediately following the paper *Mr. Emery* said: There are two points in that paper which I want to speak of while somebody else is getting ready to speak. The first one is the striking instance which President Bascom has furnished of the true criticism of the Kantian philosophy. It does not differ in result from the criticism which we have heard several times this week. It calls attention again to the trouble which Kant got himself, or us following him, into when he called space and time and the categories subjective. The criticism of President Bascom, as I understand him, is that if the term "subjective" is used there as meaning individual—which is the only sense in which it can be used to make it correspond with any true antithesis between subjective and objective—then no experience at all would be really possible. If each individual mind itself creates space and time and the categories, there is no conjunction between his experience and mind. It might be doubted whether Kant intended to be taken exactly in that way; but if he did not, why not say that space and time are objective? Indeed, Kant did say that the *Categories* are objective also. But the criticism directed against Kant's system was, as I understand it, if space and time are not objective, then no experience is possible. And that point struck me as being a point of

criticism which had been developed before and reached by rather a different method.

Then in regard to the second part of the lecture—that is, the paper on liberty—I was particularly struck by the way in which President Bascom comes to his positive results. I never happened to read or hear before a treatment of freedom by exactly this method, and yet the result arrived at is exactly the result which I have been accustomed to consider the true one. The illustration in regard to Aladdin is a very forcible one. There could be but one Aladdin. That is to say, such liberty as Aladdin's destroys itself. There is no such thing as liberty in that sense. Liberty which does not make itself into law is not liberty, as the lecturer well said.

*Professor Harris*—I would point out also that there was a very close agreement with the paper yesterday of Professor Morris on the point that a higher advance in knowledge is an advance away from form. The word "form" has a thousand technical meanings. Of course he (Dr. Bascom) means "shape." The Platonists and Aristotelians would say the mind goes *towards* pure "form" in another sense from that in which President Bascom says it moves away from it. "Form" is also an Aristotelian technical term; but the Aristotelian would hold that going towards pure form is the same as going towards the pure "act;" because they hold that the pure form is the same thing as pure energy. It is a process of going away from determination or shape and the lower finite categories, and towards the Absolute, which is pure intelligence and will. I could not help thinking carefully, as Professor Bascom was reading, about the point he made in regard to technical terms, and which I could not quite understand. Because the paper used technical terms derived from a good many systems, and it is evident, therefore, that there could have been no intentional disparagement of technique, although it appeared so in his first statements. Technique is absolutely necessary in philosophy, because philosophy undertakes to look at the world in a different way from common sense. Common sense gets hold of facts and generalizes, but it does not generalize to the same extent that philosophy does. Philosophy undertakes to reach the universal and the one, or, rather, to explain the world by one principle. It is very interesting in the history of philosophy to see how many different techniques have been made, and it is also interesting to see how each language has its own way of cutting up the world into concepts, and expressing it in different classes. No two nations take the same view of the world; each one classifies objects in its own way, and hence the words do not exactly cover the words of another people. And it is very interesting to go from one language to another,

and get to understand the different standards of looking at the world used by different peoples. And so in philosophy these technical expressions may seem to be walls which hide one man's thinking from another. Our only refuge is to translate each technique into others. We shall find something in each technique that has a certain advantage. In the history of philosophy we meet hundreds of different techniques, and each one can give us some aid. Each philosopher started out with some special view of the world, and colored his whole philosophical system with the tinge of the peculiar technique that he used. Of course, if we seek to adopt a technique for ourselves, we must look for that of the philosophical system that is the most perfect, and this would be the Aristotelian technique. And yet it is desirable that every one should study many systems of philosophy, and should endeavor to find the equivalent of these technical terms in the Aristotelian system as being the one that has most widely spread and entered into all languages, and has expressed and systematized the bulk of the thinking in all modern languages. I doubt if natural science has an advantage over philosophy in avoiding technique, or whether it can possibly get along and state its conclusions in common language. The technical term used in the paper, "molecular changes," talks about that of which common sense knows nothing. So when natural science talks about "atoms," and about "laws," and "matter," and "force," it uses those words in a sense that the unscientific mind does not understand at all. The unscientific mind confounds all the time universals and particulars. As President Bascom knows well in his long experience of teaching philosophy, one has all the time to call attention to the fact that often a person thinks he uses common sense and is speaking of particular things, and yet is using universal terms. I think he will agree with me that the most fearful technique in philosophy is that of the person who uses a common term in a special sense and yet leaves the reader to think that he is using it in the ordinary sense; for the common language differs from the scientific in using terms vaguely, being unconscious of most of the specific content. It is as if a dwarf should put on clothes that were made for a giant, using only a small part of the room in them. Philosophical culture has to draw out the grasp and meaning of words, and make common sense conscious of those universals. Socrates did this by showing that the person who used those words without appreciating them is all the time contradicting himself. Socrates finds a person going about Athens with one of these great words on his tongue; he draws him on step by step, and makes him conscious what a great world of meaning is contained in the word, and the person finds that the meaning of the word is wide enough to contain

many contradictory meanings of such a narrow scope as his little mind harbors.

So in regard to the use of common terms. If there are words expressing familiar ideas, the mere common sense has a right to those words, and they should not be taken away from it. Therefore, too, if in the language there are these general terms, which the spirit of the language has made to express higher thoughts of great compass and depth, we can find them out and use them for technique in philosophy. It makes a better philosophical technique to use these rarer words than those common, familiar words whose meaning is so shallow—for, when they come to the ear, the person does not say, "I know all that that means." He sees that it is a little larger than his habitual thought; it calls out reflection; it shocks him, as it were; it makes him come back again and again to it. I know the experience of reading Kant, after reading Cousin, who writes in a popular style, though very excellent in its way. Coming to Kant's Critique, the person reads a sentence and strikes his head, and says: "I am sleepy; I don't know what the matter is with me." And he tries another sentence then and there, and he reads on down to the bottom of the page, and finds that he does not know at all what it means. That was my experience. I read Kant for ten months, and couldn't understand anything he was talking about. The words seemed to be put together all right, nouns and verbs; but what the sentences meant I didn't know. I found out in the progress of my study this curious fact, that whereas before I commenced the study I had been subject to hypochondria when I went into a library, saying, "I never shall be able to master all these books; it will take me a whole lifetime to read a single alcove," I found that I was gaining greatly in power to get through a book in a short time. I found that there were some books that would have taken me three weeks before that I could now read in three minutes. I could take the table of contents and find what the author was driving at, and all that he could tell me.

But by and by the thought of Kant began to dawn on my intellect; and by and by I saw also the results that flow from it, and which have been mentioned. With regard to the view of this paper, I would like to suggest it as a question: Whether we may not take a different standpoint in regard to mind, and say that mind is not individual mind in the sense of being special mind; whether, in fact, the knowing consciousness does not deal with universals, the principle of mind being that of participation (the Platonic thought); so that this mind, John's, for instance, in knowing takes hold on the same things and participates in knowing with all the rest of mankind. That is, throughout it is participation and uni-

versal all the time. Therefore it makes it possible with that view of the mind to see how the Kantian philosophy may be true, if it is expounded through the idea of participation. If we know through illumination from the divine Mind, and He makes the world so that time and space are his forms creating it, and he endows us so much above other beings in nature that we can enter, as it were, into his creative act by which he makes the world; that we can see time and space as forms of our mind; it is not the form of our particular, individual, special mind; it is the form of the divine Mind. So we would say that time and space are external to us. But we could say, on the other hand, that time and space are internal to us, and that we hold that which is common to each other, because each of us has this divine element in the form and matter of knowing. And in participating in that, we find the world, as it were, within us; within that subjectivity. That is, we find within us rationality, time and space, the categories, and universality; and we find them through the fact that God has made us in his own image. If we include the world of ideas as logical conditions of this world of extension, we include the world of atom and matter and fact. Therefore the world stands to us as based upon mind, because all its logical conditions are ideal, therefore it is knowable. But mind, as the divine Mind, is the absolute real.

Thus some of us have been trying to show how, if rightly interpreted, Kant's subjective philosophy falls into harmony with Aristotle's objective philosophy, wherein he showed that divine reason makes the world, and, therefore, reason or mind is the substance of things, of matter, and of everything else, not in the pantheistic sense, but in the creative sense. So that, on the one hand, looking at it ontologically, we trace it back to Mind as the fundamental presupposition of everything; and Kant, on the other hand, comes to the same conclusion. He comes to it, not as his individual mind—the private property of Immanuel Kant, though he comes to it subjectively—but as mind which has an infinite form to it. And so we say that absolute Mind and Reason is the foundation of things.

I am satisfied myself with the Greek basis. I should not fall into the subjective scepticism in any case. But those who do take that subjective basis and reach scepticism have been answered by Kant. Kant says: "Just take a good inventory of your subjective mind, and see what comes of it." And so he takes that thorough inventory, and without seeing himself clearly what he had arrived at, he comes to the same result as Aristotle, and therefore he solves that antithesis, and bridges the chasm between subjective and objective.

*Mr. Sanborn*—I have not had the pleasure of hearing all the papers and discussions of this week touching upon the life and philosophy of Kant. Many things have been said, some of which I may perhaps repeat. I would say a word on a subject of which Professor Harris and others have spoken—terminology and of method—and to remind the school of what one or two great poets have said on this subject.

Mention has been made, and very properly, of the interest which Goethe took in the philosophy of Kant. No doubt it was real and profound. Yet, when he came to review his life, after he had reached the age of seventy or eighty years, he said to Eckermann that he had given too much attention to the study of philosophy; and he thought that Schiller had occupied himself and his friends rather too much with the study of metaphysics. And he made this remark in 1829, in another connection—he was then eighty years old—“Schubert’s book is chiefly intended to prove that there is a standpoint without philosophy—that of the healthy human understanding; and that art and science have always thriven best independent of philosophy. This is water for our mill. For my part I have always kept aloof from philosophy; the standpoint of the natural human understanding was the one I preferred.” There is a great element of truth in this, and also in what President Bascom has said this afternoon in regard to the practical value of philosophy—that it must deal with the things and facts of life as they are. Not the outside material existence or the ordinary events of life; but it must deal with the experiences that come to men in this world, otherwise it is not of much importance. Now a poet like Goethe, who was both poet and philosopher, and our own poet here (*Mr. Emerson*), who is also poet and philosopher, but whose preëminence lies in his poetic faculty—these men are to be excused from following very long and very steadily in the path of philosophic method, because they have a path of their own by which they reach their results in a more natural and effective way.

Many just tributes have been paid here to the influence of Kant’s philosophy; we can see what a prodigious influence it exerted; not, however, so much directly as indirectly. Reference has been made to his successors—to Fichte—concerning whom we shall hear a paper next week by *Mr. Mead*—and to Schelling; and of course we have heard much of the Hegelian philosophy. Now I incline to think that up to this time, when perhaps the condition of things may be changing, the spirit of the Kantian movement in Europe—I mean by that its higher and more active spirit (not dwelling upon those secondary results to which *Dr. Porter* called our attention this morning)—has more affected America through *Mr. Emerson* than it has through all other persons combined. For Em-

erson, like Goethe and unlike Kant, has been one of those men who directly and by their own personality affect mankind. Wherever Goethe appeared, wherever his personal presence was seen or felt, or his works were read, he excited a very warm interest—sometimes for him, sometimes against him, but always a direct and profound influence. The effect has been sometimes a repugnant one, stimulating hostility, or, at any rate, a collision of some kind; but it has also produced a very favorable feeling towards him, and an interest in the things which he stood for. Now, so far as I can observe, such influences proceeding from Mr. Emerson are the strongest literary and poetic and spiritual influences—without including the interest attaching to systems of religion—which have heretofore existed in America. Emerson himself was strongly influenced, no doubt, by the German thought; not so much directly by Kant as through Goethe, and also through Fichte, and Emerson's influence, extending to the friends immediately about him—to Theodore Parker, who was very much awakened by Mr. Emerson, to Dr. Hedge (who, notwithstanding his early studies in German philosophy, I fancy, was quickened more by his personal friendship for Mr. Emerson than by anything that happened to him in Germany), to Margaret Fuller, and others—the influence, I say, radiating from these persons who lighted their torch at Emerson's, has affected our country very much.

I would also refer to a matter which has been mentioned here, but which needs to be mentioned more directly—the fact that Mr. Emerson, through *The Dial*, communicated to the American public their most distinct knowledge of what Schelling was doing in those later years when he was brought to Berlin, at the instance of the Prussian king, an opponent of the Hegelian philosophy. In July and October, 1842, and in January, 1843—the number is dated then, but really relates to the year 1842—Mr. Emerson called attention to what was going on in Berlin in these words: “The King is discontented with the Hegel influence which has predominated at Berlin, and with this view he summons the great Schelling, now nearly seventy years old, to lecture on the Philosophy of Revelation. These lectures began in November, 1841. The lecture-room was crowded to suffocation; the pale Professor, whose face resembles that of Socrates, was greeted with thunders of acclamation; but he remained pale and unmoved, as if in his own study.”

Mr. Emerson, I think, was indebted for that information to Mr. Elliot Cabot and Mr. Charles Stearns Wheeler, both of them graduates of Harvard College, who had gone abroad to study in Germany. This introductory lecture was described by Mr. Cabot in a letter and translated by Mr. Wheeler, and the translation is published here. In this letter of Mr.

Cabot there is a description of Schelling's course after lecturing at Berlin in 1841-'42.

In a subsequent letter he gives Mr. Wheeler's translation of the introductory lecture itself. I will read one or two passages in this lecture as having some bearing upon the remarks which have been made here during this week.

"At no time," said Schelling, at Berlin, in November, 1841, "has philosophy encountered so mighty a reaction from the side of life as at this moment, a proof that it has penetrated to those life-questions in relation to which indifference is neither lawful nor possible to any. Philosophy at present affirms itself religious in its conclusions, while the world denies that it is so, and regards particularly its deductions of Christian dogmas as mere illusions. Such is even the confession of many of its faithful or unfaithful disciples. . . . It is a great thing that philosophy in these days has become a universal concern. The very opposition that I have mentioned shows that philosophy has ceased to be an affair of the schools, and has become the business of the nation. The history of German philosophy is, from the beginning, inwrought with the history of the German people. In a time of deepest debasement, philosophy held the German erect. In the schools of philosophy—who in this connection remembers not Fichte, Schleiermacher?—many found in philosophical contests the resolution, the courage, the self-possession, which in far other battle-fields were afterwards put to the test."

Schelling referred here to that extraordinary scene at the close of the Napoleonic wars, when the philosophers of Germany, headed by Fichte, were in fact the leaders of the German people, and contributed more than any political combination to the overthrow of Napoleon, that pest and scourge of Europe.

*Mr. Alcott*—Human faculties are differently cast into different types. It is in vain for persons of a certain type to attempt, without very long effort and a probable failure, to look at things in a purely philosophical manner; and it is equally impossible, ordinarily, for those of another type to look at them in any other than a poetic manner. For, if imagination and fancy predominate in us, we look at things symbolically, and adopt a symbolical language by which to express our ideas. Such is the poet. He is so cast. He does his work so. For, although he may study philosophy, and possibly put himself into that predicament, seeing things as the philosopher does, logically—by the reason and the understanding—yet these not being his strongest faculties, he does not succeed. So, on the other hand, one who has the logical faculty and the understanding, and wants to put things into strong logical speech and formulas, will not succeed

ordinarily in writing poems, or in looking at things poetically. Do not seek to put your minds, those of you who are not logical, into logical forms, thinking that you must learn that alphabet to know anything; neither shall I say to you who are logical, Put your thoughts into poetic forms. The good God who has sent us here gives different types, and our methods are different. There can be no enthusiasm or great work in the world that is not done in harmony with our faculties as we receive them from God himself and as we follow out their law. So we should be very much disappointed if persons should go away from the teaching here and suppose that they must necessarily do their work in a certain way. Goethe and Emerson and Shakespeare and Dante, and the great poets of the past, occupy a wide space in the world's history, and interest a large class of people in their manner. So do the great thinkers, Aristotle, Plato, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte. But do you not see that you could not put each one into the other's brains? It could not be done. Put a poet into a logician's head, or a logician into a poet's head, and see what he will do with those faculties. They do not work so.

The beauty of this school is that we have those who speak from these different aspects, so that we gather an idea of the different modes in which thought works. We call it a School of Philosophy, it is true. Mr. Emerson puts his philosophy into warm tropes, and paints pictures with his words. But Hegel and that class of thinkers strip off the image and give you the pure, absolute truth as it lies in their minds. Mr. Emerson could not have had his influence on the world had he endeavored to do his work as Hegel did. Indeed, he reads those books very little; he has no success in reading them. He dips into them and gets the substance of them; but to follow out any logical method would not be his way. This is the poetic side, the light side; that is the logical side, the darker side, which is to be brought out into the light. Imagination and reason are the opposite poles of one sphere. The poet and the philosopher work differently, but they do the same work.

#### LETTER OF DR. S. H. HODGSON.

*To the Editor of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.*

SIR: When Mr. Collyns Simon, your correspondent in the number for January last, characterizes Hegel, M. Renouvier, and myself, as *Materialists*, he shows either an incapacity, or shall I say, a perversity, of judgment so great as to disqualify him for being profitably argued with. It is ludicrous to call Hegel a materialist. Equally so to call M. Renouvier one. As to myself, I hold that I am protected from the appellation